This paper describes a model of partisan fiscal adjustment where policy is made in a bicameral legislature subject to a veto by an independent executive. We show how changes in fiscal policy depend not just on the configuration of parties, but also on veto institutions and on which party or parties was responsible for the previous budget. In our model, the legislative party is unable to shift fiscal policy all the way to its preferred point in one step, but can take advantage of repeated shocks to shift fiscal policy toward its preferred target slowly, probably over several budget cycles. We describe how legislatures can use shocks to shift expenditures and revenues and how this means that over time one can observe persistence of past partisan targets or slower and faster shifts toward new targets. We show also how the amount of change in policy should vary according to how control is configured and how patterns of control interact with institutions.
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The 1995 budget crisis in Congress produced a situation in which no formal budget passed and the government operated under a series of continuing resolutions which carried over the provisions of the previous year's budget. The result, long periods of uncertainty and conflict, focused attention on the political problem of fiscal adjustment in a bicameral system when parties are polarized in terms of having different partisan targets for the scale of taxes and public spending.
In this paper we describe a model of partisan fiscal adjustment where policy is made in a bicameral legislature subject to a veto by an independent executive. We focus particularly on "split branch" government, where the legislature and the executive are controlled by different parties. We show how changes in fiscal policy depend not just on the configuration of parties, but also on veto institutions and on which party or parties was responsible for the previous budget. In our model, the legislative party is unable to shift fiscal policy all the way to its preferred point in one step. However, it is able to take advantage of repeated shocks to shift fiscal policy toward its preferences slowly, probably over several budget cycles.
Our basic model and a few extensions show that budgets made under divided government can depend on a lot of features that we often think of as procedural details, like the identity of the "veto player," the last legislative vote needed to override an executive veto, or the exact level of spending that would occur if no new agreement is reached. This is not because control of the legislature is unimportant. In fact, in our model, the legislature's proposal power makes it the only branch capable of unilaterally imposing adjustments in fiscal policy. However, the model shows that there are circumstances when partisan change in policy instruments can be slow 5RNKV DTCPEJ because of institutional features. Parties, the past, and institutions all matter, and this paper makes the interconnections between them systematic.
The paper describes what has come to be called a "partisan" model of policy, one in which politicians of different parties, reflecting differing preferences in the electorate, promise and produce different policies. A complete partisan model has two sides, a "policy function" which describes policy outcomes and a "vote function" which describes the electoral reaction. This paper extends important aspects of the policy function that were neglected in our earlier work (see Alt and Lowry, 1994) . It extends the partisan model to a context in which its usual intuition, the predictable big swings in policy of the "Westminster" model of party government, don't emerge because transitions of power are rarely between party configurations conferring full control of separated institutions. Nevertheless, the underpinnings of partisan models shine through, namely that systematic, persistent differences in the preferences of separate groups of politicians come to be reflected in predictably different policy actions.
We start by describing the simplest cases in detail, to describe how legislatures can use shocks to shift expenditures and revenues and how this means that over time one can observe persistence of past partisan targets or slower and faster shifts toward new targets. We show how the amount of change in policy should vary according to how control is configured and how patterns of control interact with institutions. We then discuss the importance of both past party control and the partisanship of the legislator whose vote is critical to overriding a gubernatorial veto, as well as the nature of the governor's veto powers as prescribed by state laws.
Furthermore, while our earlier work looked at the long term behavior of a statistical model in order to estimate the values of partisan targets, here we look at the short term transitions of power, in a formal model to see how policy should move, assuming that parties have different 5RNKV DTCPEJ targets. If voters wish to change fiscal policy by changing party control of government, how much change can they expect to see? The answer depends on whether elections change the partisan identity of the governor and one or both branches of the legislature, as well as veto rules and the level of spending that would occur even without new appropriations.
The empirical sections of this paper lay out a specification for estimating a dynamic partisan model of budgets in the states. We report estimates based on taxes and spending in 35 nonsouthern states from . While at this writing we are only able to make a start, we derive an estimating model which is capable of incorporating the features discussed above. In estimates from this model, the speeds of adjustment to targets line up as expected, with unified governments showing faster adjustment than divided, and the party targets go in the right direction, with Democrats apparently targeting a larger share of state incomes for the public budget than Republicans. Interestingly, Republicans react much more strongly to budget surpluses by reducing revenues than do Democrats. We give some preliminary comments on the robustness of these results and point out how other conjectures can be tested within the same model.
Predicting Budgets Under Divided Government
We focus in this section on divided government, which has been a feature of state politics for a long time. Key describes it as widespread (due to malapportionment) in the 1930s. Fiorina (1992) documents how the growth of Democratic legislative control in the 1950s led the incidence of divided control to grow, outside the South. Over the forty or so years from , divided government was more common in the 35 nonsouthern states than was unified control by either of the major parties: the figures for the period are 32 per cent split branch (one party controls the executive and the other party controls the legislature), 28 per cent unified 5RNKV DTCPEJ Republican control, 22 per cent unified Democratic control, and 20 per cent split control of the legislature.
Context
Our earlier work distinguished unified (one party controls all branches) from divided government at the state level, and showed that on the whole unified governments react quicker to recessionary shocks than do divided governments (and particularly divided legislatures). Stylizing Alt and Lowry (1994) freely, we also showed that certain balanced budget laws were effective in compelling adjustments in fiscal policy, at least under unified control of government. We also showed that the parties differed in the long run target shares of personal income that they wished to take in revenues for public purposes.
1 While both parties seemed equally willing to spend federal contributions to the states, the Democrats acted as though they had an underlying goal of taking about 10 per cent of state personal income in taxes, while for Republicans the corresponding target was 5 per cent.
The other two findings, laws work and split legislatures involve delays regardless of laws, suggested problems of accountability which we take up in two related papers. In Lowry and Alt (1997) , we inquire why the balanced budget laws are effective, especially since we never observe courts involved in their enforcement. We show that the laws are effective because the operation of bond markets gives politicians an incentive to maintain orderly fiscal policies, namely, lower operating costs of government (and thus more funds to spend on other things) in those cases where unforeseen economic circumstances compel running a deficit in the short term. Because the laws make it easier for market participants to discern the nature and intentions of a state's fiscal agents, they are willing to give 5RNKV DTCPEJ a discount to the debt of a state with stringent laws precisely when it is most wanted, in a fiscal crisis.
To keep the discount intact, fiscal agents adopt sound practices. In Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998) , we present evidence that voter reactions to fiscal policy outcomes are contingent on government institutions and partisan control: voters punish Republican gubernatorial candidates following unexpected increases in spending and revenues; they punish the incumbent governor's party in legislative elections for fiscal deficits; and the electoral-policy connection is stronger when one party controls both branches of the government.
So we have evidence for long-run party differences in targets; evidence that laws requiring budget balance matter and the likelihood that they are underwritten and enforced by market inducements; and evidence that voters hold parties accountable for fiscal policy. What we need to provide next is a model of how changes in party control produce changes in fiscal policy through the budget process, in a way which is sensitive to the fact that changes in the American states are rarely between unified control of government by different parties. Rather, they are more likely to involve changes to or from various forms of divided government.
Unified Party Government
In our previous work, we argued that the executive can either approve or veto changes proposed by the legislature, but must exercise the veto power within a certain (usually limited) time period after the legislature has acted, or the legislative proposal takes effect. The budget process that we envisage is as follows. It begins (often around January 1) with the Governor filing a budget request. In our model, this is a partisan document, which forecasts revenues (usually by forecasting income growth and setting taxes to produce the desired revenues) and sets This is an old idea in partisan models, finding implementation in various forms in the work of Frey (1978) , Hibbs (1987) , and Alt & Chrystal (1983) . All these works abstract away from out spending, so that the aggregate budget consumes the share of state personal income which is the desired target level of the party of the Governor. Clearly legislatures bargain over and modify budgets, but in our simple model of the aggregate size of the budget, if a majority of each chamber of the legislature is of the same party as the Governor, each chamber passes the Governor's budget and he signs it.
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If the same configuration governed in the last period, the income share reflected in the budget will not change, as revenues can always be adjusted to offset past shocks. If the configuration is new, and the previous budget reflected different preferences, nothing stops a unified government from moving directly to its preferred outcome, though in practice an empirical model might allow this to take more than one budget cycle. Given the evidence that Democrats are the high demand party, unified Democrats are likely to inherent budgets that are "too small" given their preferences, whereas unified Republicans are likely to inherit budgets that are "too 
Split Branch Government
If parties differ in their preferred levels of spending and one party controls the executive and the other controls both chambers of the legislature, then the expected spending level for any partisan differences in the resulting composition of spending which no doubt also exist.
Several states require supermajorities in each chamber to pass budgets. In most of these, party control has been so one-sided in the last four decades that these requirements do not change our results. However, in three states, California, Ohio, and Illinois, there are a large number of years in which neither party "controls" one or both legislative chambers in terms of having enough partisans to pass a budget without bipartisan cooperation.
given year cannot be optimal for both parties, and will probably not be the same as the level which would be chosen by either party in unified government. In this section we assume that each party is internally homogeneous, party-specific preferences are common knowledge, the governor possesses an "all-or-nothing" veto, and the legislative majority is not veto proof. We show that adjustments to expected spending or revenues will depend on (i) which party controls which branch, (ii) whether the previous year's budget resulted in a surplus or a deficit, and (iii) the location of the reversion point, i.e., the levels of spending and revenues that would occur in the absence of a budget agreement. We address the consequences of heterogeneous parties and alternative veto rules in the next section.
We analyze this situation using a spatial model that differs somewhat from the model in Alt and Lowry (1994) . Figures 1a-1d show four scenarios that are discussed below. The horizontal axis represents general spending as a share of state income; the vertical axis represents general revenues as a share of income; and the 45 degree line is the set of points such that spending equals revenues. We assume that all fiscal year budgets must lie on the balanced budget line.
3 Both parties have a most-preferred budget, with Democrats preferring to spend and tax more than Republicans. Party-specific preferences for points away from their most-preferred budgets are represented by elliptical indifference curves. The ellipses tilt up and to the right, indicating that spending and revenues are positive complements (Hinich and Munger, 1997) .
Intuitively, both parties are more willing to tolerate spending levels above (below) their most
We abstract away from whether or not the budget is planned to balance exactly or includes a surplus. We treat any planned surplus as fixed, and not adjusted according to current circumstances or spending desires. preferred level if revenues are also above (below) their most preferred level, so that the budget is at least balanced.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In each diagram, the point labeled "t1" represents the budget passed for the previous fiscal year, while "r1" is the previous year's actual outcome, net of any purely transitory shocks. Point r1 might be above the balanced budget line if, for example, the economy did better than expected last year, generating excess revenues, and the new level of income is expected to continue for the coming fiscal year. As in our earlier paper, we assume that any lasting shocks (the difference between r1 and t1) affect revenues only, but we no longer assume that r1 is also the reversion point in the event of a budget stalemate. Rather, we assume that some portion of spending will not occur unless new appropriations are passed and signed by the governor. It seems reasonable that federal transfers, spending financed by dedicated taxes and fees, and entitlements will be the subject of a continuing resolution, so that the maximum difference between r1 and the reversion point "r2" consists of non-entitlement spending financed out of state general fund revenues. We have no precise data on how large this figure is, although the percentage of general spending (including entitlements) financed out of general fund revenues varied from 24 percent in Wyoming to 70 percent in Massachusetts in 1996. (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997). For expositional purposes, we simply assume that r2 lies somewhere between r1 and the vertical axis, indicating that some, but not all, spending will be discontinued absent a budget agreement. Note that revenues at r2 are the same as at r1, because taxes and fees continue to be collected with or without new appropriations. Figure 1a shows the case of a Democratic governor and Republican legislature in the year following a surplus, so that r1 lies above the balanced budget line. The reversion point, r2, 5RNKV DTCPEJ represents an even larger surplus, since some spending would be discontinued absent an agreement but revenues would continue to be collected. The Republican legislature realizes that the Democratic governor will cast a sustainable veto against any budget that leaves the Governor worse off than the reversion point. The legislature thus sets the new budget at the point labeled "target" where the balanced budget line intersects the Governor's indifference curve through r2.
The legislature prefers this point to r2, while the Governor is no worse off. The result is a planned decrease in both spending and revenues relative to the previous year's budget target (t1), and the actual outcome (r1). Figure 1b shows the same governor and legislature faced with a deficit due to a negative revenue shock. As we have drawn the figure, the shift from r1 to r2 eliminates almost all of the projected deficit, so the new target is very near the reversion point. This does not mean, however, that the legislature cuts all non-entitlement spending financed from general fund revenues. Points on the diagram represent aggregate general spending and revenues, and the new budget may also include cuts in entitlement programs or programs financed by dedicated taxes and fees. The result is a cut in both spending and revenues compared to the previous budget target, although planned revenues are slightly higher than the previous year's actual outcome. Figure 1c shows the case of a Republican governor, a Democratic legislature and a surplus. Planned spending and revenues both increase relative to t1, but planned revenues may not increase relative to r1. Note, however, that whereas revenues clearly decrease in Figure 1a under a Republican legislature, they either increase or decrease by a smaller amount with a Democratic legislature. Figure 1d shows a Republican governor and a Democratic legislature faced with a prospective deficit. Note that there are two different reversion points (r2 and r2') that produce 5RNKV DTCPEJ the same budget target. Despite the fact that the Democratic legislature passes a budget that it prefers to the reversion point, the new spending target is actually lower than the previous year's target and outcome. The revenue target is lower than the previous year's target, but higher than the previous year's actual outcome. Finally, if the reversion point lies far enough to the left (not shown), the Democratic legislature may actually be able increase both spending and revenues. The exact outcomes in the scenarios depicted by Figures 1a-1d can be manipulated by shifting the location of t1, r1 and r2 relative to the most-preferred budgets, but the general pattern of the predictions is clear. In the case of split branch government, it is the legislature that controls the policy target. Republican legislatures are able to ratchet down spending targets following either a surplus or a deficit. The new revenue target under a Republican legislature will also be less than the previous year's revenue target, but may be slightly more than the previous year's actual revenues following a deficit. Democratic legislatures can ratchet up spending following a surplus, but can only hold the line against further cuts following a deficit. The revenue target under a Democratic legislature should also exceed the previous year's target (though not necessarily the outcome) following a surplus, but the prediction following a deficit depends on the exact location of the reversion point. The asymmetry between Democrats and Republicans results from the fact that the reversion point always involves a decrease in spending relative to the previous year's budget. Finally, although the legislative party sets the new budget, it will generally be forced to accept some compromise with the governor in order to avoid a veto. This 5RNKV DTCPEJ implies that the speed of transition following a change in partisan control will be slower under split branch government than under unified government.
Split Branch Extensions
Past Party control. Budget targets depend not only on the preferences of the current group in control, but also on which party most recently controlled fiscal policy. This may be represented in our model by the location of t1 and r1, the previous year's budget target and outcome. Suppose that we currently have a Democratic governor, a Republican legislature, and the previous year ended in a deficit, as in Figure 1b . If last year's budget reflected (was passed by) a unified Republican government, t1 should be equal to the Republicans' most-preferred budget. The reversion point following a deficit will include lower revenues and lower spending than the previous budget target (r2 will be below and to the left of t1), so the Republican legislature will simply adopt the previous year's budget, and the Democratic governor will sign it. If the previous budget was set by a unified Democratic government, however, then t1 will be equal to the Democrats' most-preferred budget. Now if there is a deficit, the Republican legislature should be able to impose a budget that lies in between the two most-preferred budgets. If another deficit occurs in the next year, then the Republican legislature may be able to ratchet revenues and spending down further, but probably by a lesser amount.
Heterogeneous parties and veto override points. In general, when the legislature under split branch government inherits a budget different from its most preferred budget, it can take advantage of shocks that knock the budget out of balance to move policy toward its ideal by trading a little balance for a little size. Where the legislative party is homogeneous and veto proof, however, the legislative party immediately proposes its own ideal point. Empirically, this should look just like unified government.
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Where parties are heterogeneous, the budget target depends on the preferences of the median legislator and either the governor or the last vote needed in the legislature to override an executive veto, whichever is closest to the median. If the governor's most-preferred budget is closest to that of the median legislator, then the results are as in Figures 1a-1d , except that now we substitute the median legislator for the unitary legislative party. Otherwise, a comparable game occurs between the last legislator needed to override a veto and the median legislator.
Line-Item Veto. In many states, the governor possesses some version of line-item veto authority (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1991). Carter and Schap (1990) argue that in many circumstances the effect of a line-item veto on aggregate spending is indeterminate, because the line-item veto alters the composition rather than the aggregate level of spending. That is, the reduction in expenditure on one line item may be more or less than offset by changes in expenditure on another line item. In our terms, each line item has its own marginal override legislator, but there is no guarantee that the budget comprised of all just-overridden line-item vetoes is itself approved by either the governor or the legislator possessing the veto override vote on aggregate revenues and spending.
However, if we define an item veto as the governor's power to counterpropose proportionate budget cuts, but not increases, an interesting further case arises. If we have split branch government and the legislature is controlled by Republicans, the case will work out exactly the same as the all-or-nothing veto, since the Democratic governor lacks the power to propose increases. If the legislature is the high demand party, it can propose increases and the executive can fine tune proportionate proposed cuts, so their powers become more symmetric. Empirically, this could mean that the reaction to a shock will be slowest where there is a line-item veto, 5RNKV DTCPEJ polarized parties, and a low-demand executive, that is, a standoff between a Democratic legislature and a strong Republican executive.
Empirical Predictions for Split Branch Government
In order to test all of the facets of this model empirically, we would need data on budget targets, actual budget outcomes less purely transient shocks, reversion points, and most-preferred points for the executive, median legislator in each chamber, and marginal override legislator in each chamber. Data limitations require that we test the following, greatly simplified, hypothesis: Hypothesis 2. Under split branch government, the legislative party sets the new budget, subject to an executive veto. Changes in revenues and spending should be greater (more positive) when the Democrats control the legislature than when the Republicans control the legislature, but the speed of transition will be less than under unified government.
Split Legislature Government
In the case of split legislature government, different parties control each chamber, so it may be a while before a proposal is made. However, any budget which satisfies the Governor's legislative partisans should satisfy the Governor, so once a proposal is made there is no reason to expect a veto. Clarke (1998) contends that the governor's party will have more leverage in conference committee, and thus control policy. We have been unable to generate this result from any sort of formal model, however. In general, the outcome of this sort of bargaining depends on the relative costs and benefits to each party of reaching agreement, the two parties' discount rates (how desperate are they for a deal?), and their beliefs about each other's costs, benefits and discount rates (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) . While we are unable to generate a clear prediction for split legislature government, we take as our null hypothesis Clarke's assertion, and add that the 5RNKV DTCPEJ rate at which budget targets change following a change in government will be slower if different parties control different chambers of the legislature than if there is unified party government:
Hypothesis 3: In the case of split legislature government, fiscal policy targets are set by the governor's party. Changes in revenues and spending will be greater (more positive) with a Democratic governor than a Republican governor, but the speed of adjustment is slower than under unified party government.
Empirical Specification
To turn these conjectures into estimates, we first describe the observations we will use, then how we turn our model of the budget process into an estimating equation, and finally derive a specification which allows us to test the hypotheses listed above. We take each of these steps in turn. First, we describe the variety of changes of party control we observe, and how we simplify them to make estimation tractable. Then we describe the budget process and the key parameters we will estimate and relationships we expect. Finally, we derive a specification we can estimate.
The next part contains some preliminary estimation results.
Making party control changes tractable: data
We base our estimates on data covering forty years of party government in the 35 nonsouthern American states, from . Spotty data availability in the early years means that an effectively complete data set (including lagged variables) is only available from 1954 on.
There is, however, a much more serious problem to confront. The intuition of the party controltarget model is one of changes of control between effectively unified parties (see Hibbs' (1987) model of fiscal policy, for example) as though divided government did not exist. The problem is that despite numerous changes of party control, there are exactly ten episodes of switching between unified control by opposite parties. This is elaborated in Figure 2 and Table 1. Massachusetts' early transition is much like Connecticut's, but it stays more Democrat-controlled. The effects we model should leave their traces in the histories of fiscal policy in these states, but probably only if we think of the effective partisan target for the budget as itself a time series variable that moves back and forth in response to shocks in proportion to the distance between it and the "normal" target of a party finding itself in control. In that way, the rate at which the underlying current target moves will vary with the actual configurations (and laws, and other variables) in ways we describe.
For our first cut at estimation in this paper, however, we ignore veto issues 4 and simply focus on three patterns of party control: unified, split branch, and split legislature. Once we have an empirical model that can distinguish adjustment speeds in unified and divided government, we will then try to distinguish among different cases of divided government. We will then also consider the effects of legal constraints, most likely as interactive shifts in the speed and extent of response to unanticipated surpluses and deficits.
The issue raised by vetoes is this. If control shifts from unified Democrat to a veto-proof Republican legislature with a Democratic Governor, then we should be able to track downward movement in the income share going to revenues (since the legislature can achieve its bliss point, quickly) and that movement should be faster than in the case where the Republican legislature (following a similar transition) isn't vetoproof.
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Setting up the budget process for testing
We want to estimate such a dynamic model based on the revenue and expenditure equations that formed the basis of the long-run estimates in Alt and Lowry (1994) . 5 To summarize, income is forecast, revenues are targeted in a way which captures how far the current administration is from its bliss point and how fast its type of configuration can shift policy, and then expenditures spend target revenues fully, allowing for federal contributions, the business cycle, the interaction between institutions and past deficits and surpluses, and some degree of stickiness.
Such a model requires that income be forecast from its own past values state-by-state, then the income forecast is multiplied by the "partisan target parameter" to get expected revenues.
Formally, the partisan target parameter is an impact coefficient which reflects two things: how far the previous period's party target was from the preferred point of the current governing configuration, and a vector of dynamic coefficients capturing the different expected speeds of adjustment of different party configurations.
This paper simplifies the above discussion somewhat. We preserve the core conjecture of the model, that Democrats (Republicans) prefer a public budget which taxes and spends a higher (lower) share of state incomes. We defer considering expenditures for the moment. To make a start at showing that revenues within states over time follow predictable patterns that are consistent with the hypotheses above, in our estimates below the "budget" contains revenues
There we set revenues equal to lagged revenue and state income (embodying the assumption that the current year's revenue forecast and party targets are based on those variables), plus contemporaneous federal contributions, allowing for an adjustment to the previous surplus/deficit. A second simultaneous equation set expenditures equal to revenues plus unemployment (unanticipated cyclical expenditures and a further adjustment to the previous surplus/deficit. Party 5RNKV DTCPEJ which, random shocks apart, change in each period as a function of expected state income, federal contributions, and last year's surplus or deficit in a way that reflects three political variables: which party sets the target share of income, whether government is unified or divided, and whether divided government results from control of a bicameral legislature resting with different parties in each chamber.
Two core empirical predictions are retained. The first is that the "target share" of income should be higher under Democrats. Initially, for tractability in estimating, we will assume that Democrats have the same target in all states (and all Republicans have a common, lower target), but it would probably be desirable to relax this assumption so that only the difference between or the ratio of party targets was constant. Furthermore, nothing in our model assumes that the target shares vary according to whether control is unified or divided. In our model, patterns of control affect the speed of adjustment to targets, not the levels of the targets themselves.
Second, combining hypotheses 1-3 from earlier sections, changes of unified control should display the biggest effects in terms of the budget changing in response to new partisan targets. In theory this could happen more or less immediately. However, the presence of large numbers of entitlements and entrenched constituencies supporting existing programs (and a long history of budget studies) suggest that there will be some, perhaps considerable friction in the process.
Hence a more reasonable conjecture is that changes of party control under unified government should reveal the fastest adjustment. That is, if unified Republican control gives way to unified Democratic control, the income share of revenues should rise more quickly to a level given by the "Democratic target share" (and then stay there, random shocks apart) than would be the case if targets were derived from the long-run behavior of the estimated model, with separate sets of observations corresponding to different partisan configurations.
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the new government were divided, but with Democrats setting the target. We lack a theoretical reason to say whether split branch government adjusts faster or slower than split legislature government, but an empirical implication of Alt and Lowry (1994) was the split legislature government was most likely not to adjust at all.
Model specification 6
To sum up, which party sets the target determines whether the budget will be intended to push revenues towards (or to stay at) a higher or lower share of state income. Whether and how government is divided determines how fast the budget will move toward the target share in a given year, presuming it is not already at the target. Under unified government the governing party sets the target share of expected income in planning the budget. Where government is divided but control of the legislature is not, the party controlling the legislature sets the target share. Where control of the legislature is divided, we assume the governor's party sets the target. 
where f is the target share of income. It is useful to defines the term in braces as
so that Ω, a known combination of exogenous variables, is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the Democrats set the target and zero otherwise. For simplicity,
Now, consider a state government in which, in the present year t, the target-setting party changes. Over the next transition period of j years, j > 0, the budget's actual behavior moves towards the governing party's target. When the state has had the same target-setter for at least j years, the transition is over, and the budget can be considered to be at the target level. (Of course, the target is not reached if the target-setting party changes again before j years have passed.) Hibbs (1987) describes a related setup for fiscal policy.
Define the speed of the adjustment process in the transition as the fraction of the distance to the target which is achieved in a given year. Formally, define
where v t is the speed (which varies from year to year), R t is the actual current revenue level, and R t T is the target level of revenue.
The speed variable in any year must account for two factors, the current configuration of party control, and whether the budget is still in transition.
(In the specification we derive,
If we could use a nonlinear transfer function model, estimating impact and dynamic parameters for several explanatory variables, as Hibbs (1987) does, we would not need to be concerned about j. But transfer function methods are generally for single series rather than for a pooled crosssection time series like our data, so while we have done some single-state experiments with revenues outside the transition are an autoregressive process, but the specification can easily be augmented to allow for the impact of federal contributions and lagged surpluses in all periods.)
Given that a transition is underway, the speed function can be written
which returns the correct v depending on party configuration. To get the desired function, we need only add an appropriate indicator function for whether we are still in transition (given a choice of j).
Since Ω indicates the identity of the target-setter
where H(x) = {1|x ≥ 0; 0|x<0}. If the target has not changed in j periods, Ω t = Ω t-1 = … = Ω t-n and H(.) = 0, so v t = 0. Otherwise the the function returns the configuration-dependent speed v 0 .
It will be convenient to define ξ t j = H((Σ|Ω t -Ω t-n |) -.5) so that, for any value of j, the length of the transition, ξ t j = {1 in transition; 0 otherwise}. Now, to get the estimating model set up, define the government's (retrospective) income forecast Y t F to be autoregressive of order n:
Now, rewrite (2) as
where
and, in (6), g t and h t are configuration-specific parameters defined analogously to f t in (1c).
transfer function methods, we believe we need to derive a model which can be estimated by more
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Combining (5) and (6), multiplying out the parentheses in (5), and subtracting R t-1 from both sides gives the estimating equation
Though revenues grow throughout the period, the revenue series is stationary in its first differences form, and so ordinary regression methods can be used to estimate equation (7). There could certainly be cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and timewise correlation in the errors. Recall that since v t = ξ t j v 0 multiplying each term by v t implicitly separates the estimates in and out of transition. Out of transition all v t = 0 and so the model is just a first-order integrated process.
Hence it could also contain terms for (1-ξ t j )F t and (1-ξ t j )S t-1 , the impact of federal contributions and lagged surplus/deficit outside transition periods. Equation (7) could also contain a term for ε t-1 , the lagged income forecast error, both in and out of transition periods as well, though presumably some of that variable's effect is reflected in the lagged surplus/deficit. We will examine the effects of those terms in the empirical results section below. We also put in a full set of state fixed effects, to allow revenues to have a different mean level in each state.
To understand the estimates below better, think of equation (7) as containing three substantive explanatory variables: the income forecast Y t F , exogenous federal contributions F t , and the lagged surplus/deficit S t-1 . Each of these appears six times in the actual estimating equation, in six interactions representing the product of v t (three adjustment speeds by configuration of control, in transition periods) and a variable like f t , the two party-specific income shares determined by τ and Ω. The lagged revenue variable is multiplied by -v t , so it too has effects confined to transitions (by assumption, the transition is when the adjustment to targets is taking place) in three interactions, according to the configuration of party control.
conventional regression methods.
Estimation Results
As of this writing, we have completed only preliminary work with a model based on equation (7) above, from which we report results from data for 32 states from 1954-89. 8 The dependent variable is the change in annual general revenues as reported in the Census of Governments. Explanatory variables include the income forecast Y t F , measured as the predicted values from a regression of state aggregate personal income on its own first two lags 9 , exogenous federal contributions F t , and the lagged surplus/deficit S t-1 defined as the difference between general revenues and expenditures, lagged one year. Each variable appears in six interactions as described above, to isolate the effects of each combination of control configuration and targetsetting party. We set j=2, so adjustment speed and party target estimates are based on the transitional period of two years after a change in the identity of the target-setting party. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our data, 10 while Table 3 contains the estimated results. The model also contains terms for (1-ξ t j )F t and (1-ξ t j )S t-1 , the impact of federal contributions and lagged surplus/deficit outside transition periods, ε t-1 , the lagged income forecast error, both in and out of transition periods, and all state fixed effects not shown in the Table) .
[ Tables 2, 3 (1982) (1983) (1984) , per capita terms. Regional CPI deflators are available only from 1968 on; prior to 1968, we use the national CPI deflator.
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With j, the length of the transition period, set equal to two, the estimates in Table 3 for income forecasts, federal contributions, and lagged surpluses, respectively. Since multicollinearity lies behind some of the apparently high coefficient standard errors in Table 3 , we will use simulation methods to judge the robustness of the inferences we draw.
The first parameter of interest is the adjustment speed, which we expect to be greater for unified than divided governments. The first coefficient in Table 3 is (minus) the unified government adjustment speed 11 , so the adjustment speed, the proportion of the distance between the party's ideal share of income and the current actual income share of the public budget, is estimated to be about 15 per cent under unified government, based on transitions which last two periods. If (currently unified) Democrats would like to tax and spend at ten per cent of state income, and the publuc budget currently stands at eight per cent, the prediction is that it moves to 8.3 per cent after a year, other things equal, on average.
Is adjustment slower under divided government? Apparently, though the standard errors of the estimates do not permit firm inferences. The second coefficient, .0245, is the estimated difference between the adjustment speeds of unified and split branch government: doing the
The non-obvious parameterization used to derive the specification was chosen to make the unified government adjustment speed parameter stand alone in the regression, since it is the one for which data should be clearest, and differences most marked. subtraction reveals that the estimated adjustment speed of split branch government is about .13.
Of course, all the sources of heterogeneity discussed in the first part of this paper (identity of the veto player, direction in which adjustment is taking place, whether the last year's outcome was a surplus or deficit) are still omitted from the analysis, and could affect these estimates. Analogous calculations reveal the estimated speed of adjustment under split legislature government to be .10, about two-thirds the adjustment speed of unified government. So, qualitatively at least, the estimates line up in an order that corresponds to what was expected, based both on the model and past research: unified government adjusts fastest, and split legislature government slowest.
The party differences in desired income shares ;V ( (tau parameters) have to be derived from the estimates in Table 3 , contingent on the adjustment speeds. Since we did not employ a nonlinear regression model, we get separate estimates of the party targets for each configuration, and of course the errors of estimation in the adjustment speeds also become conflated with the estimation errors of the targets. To get the first (unified Republicans) target τ4, divide the coefficient (.0036) by the unified government adjustment speed X7) (.15). The result (.023) and all the other implied party targets are recorded in Table 4 , to spare the reader a lot of tedious calculations, and the adjustment speeds are included as well. The units of these targets 12 are described in equation (6), and are the fractions of state income (.02 would be 2 per cent, for instance) which, along with federal contributions and the lagged surplus of deficit, determine the party's revenue targets.
[ Table 4 about here]
Whether this is the target for discretionary taxing and spending (that is, excluding entitlements) and how it is affected by whether the party targets the level or change in revenues is an issue we are still trying to clarify.
The party targets from the income forecasts, for unified government, are very much as expected: the Republican target is smaller and the Democrat target larger, and both are positive.
Under split branch government, we get a negative estimate for the Republican target. Certainly the difference in magnitudes is consistent with income changes producing more revenue growth under Democrats. The pattern τ4 < 0 and τ& > τ4 is consistent with the spatial split branch model above (R t -R t-1 is greater for RD than DR following both deficits and surpluses, although both changes may be negative following a deficit). Nevertheless we have to state clearly that we are only just -as of this writing -beginning the task of fitting together the detailed predictions of the spatial models with the further interactions and restrictions that this estimating model makes possible! Again, with split legislatures, the results are qualitatively consistent with more revenue growth from a positive income shock when Democrats are the target-setters. So we take some comfort from the fact that the inequality τ& > τ4 holds up across configurations, but would not want to claim more than a preliminary, tentative result. The standard errors are also quite large in this case, so we will turn to simulations in a moment. and Republicans take much more of the lagged surplus out of revenues than do Democrats. The fit is not great, but the dependent variable is in changes, not levels. All in all, we take this result as an encouraging starting point.
Simulation results
The results in Table 4 are based on combinations of coefficients in Table 3 , several of which are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In order to get a better feel for the relationships between different parameters in Table 4 , we conducted monte carlo simulations by making random draws of coefficients using the full variance-covariance matrix underlying the results in Table 3 . These simulations revealed that the point estimates for each of the adjustment speeds are more than twice their standard errors, but that the standard errors for all of the party difference parameters exceed their point estimates.
14 We also calculated the probability that each of our hypothesized relationships between parameters occurs. Table 5 shows the estimated probabilities, based on 100,000 random draws.
The simulation results are affected by the nonlinear relationship between τ and v in the parameter estimates. In particular, a chance very small draw for v, which becomes the denominator of a ratio, can result in an outlying estimate of τ. However, we could re-present the analysis using confidence intervals around median simulated values and the qualitative interpretations we present would not change.
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Although each of the hypothesized relationships occur more often than not, the results are not overwhelming. The probability that the estimated adjustment speed for unified government exceeds that for split legislature is .772, but the probability that unified government adjusts more quickly than split branch government, or split branch more quickly than split legislature government, is less than 0.7. Similarly, the probability that the change in revenues as a share of the income forecast is greater under Democrats than Republicans ranges from .6 to .65. The probabilities of party differences in responses to lagged surpluses and deficits are somewhat greater, ranging from .64 to .853. These probabilities make it clear that there is a good deal ofparameter estimate instability, not just multicollinearity, underlying these results, though they are suggestive of some underlying relationships, nevertheless.
[ Table 5 about here]
Robustness checks
In this section, we will briefly remark on some of the estimation we have done around the results summarized in Tables 3-5 above. We have rerun this model using Stata's cross-section time series fixed effects model, and get substantially the same results, save that the centering is a little different, and the number of parameters is lower since the fixed effects are handled differently. In fact, one can almost reduce the fixed effects to a few regions (the northeast, the Ohio valley, the upper midwest, and the midwest/west) but a few discrepant cases (NM, DE, NH, maybe 1or 2 others) do not fit this classification very well, so we have not pursued this further at this time. In terms of possible heteroskedasticity, the residuals from the model in Table 2 do not differ significantly by ξV (in/out of transition) or Ω (whether the Democrats or Republicans set the target). This is mildly reassuring.
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When we increase j (two years is a short transitional period), the split branch and split legislature party target results hold up better than the unified government ones, but things really get messy in a hurry. It is possible that we need to revise the specification so that the transition is shorter for unified government than for divided government. We will pursue that in future work.
Conclusions
Conclusions are premature, at this time. We started from an interest in the effects of parties on the magnitude of budgets at the state level. Previous research suggested that such a long-term association existed and was perceived by voters and used to form expectations about the performance of partisan politicians in office. There were also suggestive empirical results hinting at differences between parties in their responses to fiscal imbalance. We have written down and analyzed a formal model of the dynamics of short-term changes in budgets in a partisan system, and derived predictions from it. The empirical specification yielded some preliminary estimates consistent with the broadest qualitative conjectures from the formal model, namely that Democrats target larger budgets from incomes and that unified government adjusts faster to new party targets. Nevertheless, this is only a beginning. Some likely next steps include reclassifying party configurations to take account of supermajority voting rules, whether the legislature is veto proof, distinguishing between surpluses and deficits, and adding a model of expenditures to our revenues equation.
We welcome comments and suggestions. Note: Source is coefficient estimates in Table 3 . Calculations follow derivation in text. 
